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Abstract—It is now well known that deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial attack. Adversarial samples are similar to
the clean ones, but are able to cheat the attacked DNN to produce incorrect predictions in high confidence. But most of the existing
adversarial attacks have high success rate only when the information of the attacked DNN is well-known or could be estimated by
massive queries. A promising way is to generate adversarial samples with high transferability. By this way, we generate 96020
transferable adversarial samples from original ones in ImageNet. The average difference, measured by root means squared deviation, is
only around 3.8 on average. However, the adversarial samples are misclassified by various models with an error rate up to 90%. Since
the images are generated independently with the attacked DNNs, this is essentially zero-query adversarial attack. We call the dataset
DAmageNet, which is the first universal adversarial dataset that beats many models trained in ImageNet. By finding the drawbacks,
DAmageNet could serve as a benchmark to study and improve robustness of DNNs. DAmageNet could be downloaded in
http://www.pami.sjtu.edu.cn/Show/56/122
Index Terms—DAmageNet, dataset, adversarial sample, transferability, ImageNet.
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1 INTRODUCTION
D EEP neural networks (DNNs) have grown into themainstream methods in many fields, thus, their vulner-
ability has attacked attentions in the recent years. An obvious
example is the existence of adversarial samples [1], which
are quite similar with the clean ones, but are able to cheat
the DNN to produce incorrect prediction in high confidence.
Various attack methods to craft adversarial samples have
been proposed, including FGSM [2], C&W [3], PGD [4], Type
I [5] and so on. Generally speaking, when the victim network
is exposed to the attacker, one can easily achieve efficient
attack with very high successful rate.
Although white-box attacks can easily cheat DNNs, the
current users actually do not worry about them, since it is
almost impossible to get complete information including the
structure and the parameters of the attacked DNNs. If the
information is kept well, one has to use black-box attack,
which can be roughly categorized into query approach [6],
[7], [8] and transfer approach [9], [10], [11]. The former one
is to estimate the gradient by querying the attacked DNNs.
However, until now, the existing query-based attack still
needs massive queries, which can be easily detected by the
defense systems.
Transfer approach attacks rely on the similarity between
the attacked DNN and a surrogate model in the attacker’s
hands. It is expected that white-box attacks on the surrogate
model can also invade the attacked DNN. Although there are
some promising studies recently [12], [13], [14], the transfer
performance is not satisfactory and high attack ratio could
be reached only when the two DNNs are very similar, which
however conflicts the aim of black-box attack.
By attacking common vulnerabilities of DNNs, we
successfully achieve zero-query black-box attack. In other
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words, we generate adversarial samples that can cheat many
unknown DNNs. Fig. 1 illustrates an example. The original
image is a "salamander" in ImageNet [15]. The adversarial
one looks very similar to the original one but is misclassified
by many DNNs well-trained in ImageNet.
Fig. 1: An adversarial sample in DAmageNet. The original
sample (in ImageNet: image n01629819_15314.JPEG, class
No.25) is shown on the left. All well-trained DNNs (listed in
the first row) correctly recognizes this image as a salamander.
The right image is the generated adversarial sample in DAm-
ageNet. The difference between the two images are slight,
however, all the listed DNNs make incorrect prediction, as
shown in the bottom row.
From original images in ImageNet, we generate 96020
images that can cheat many well-trained DNNs. Similarly to
the phenomenon shown above, these adversarial examples
have very good black-box attack performance, i.e., it is in a
zero-query mannor and make DNNs have up to 90% error
rate. We name this dataset as DAmageNet.
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2To the best of our knowledge, DAmageNet is the first
dataset that provides black-box adversarial attack images.
Those images DAmage many neural networks without any
knowledge and any query. But the aim is not to really damage
them, but to point out the weak parts of neural networks
and thus those examples are valuable to improve the neural
networks by means such as adversarial training [16], [17],
robustness certification [18] and so on.
In the following, we will briefly introduce adversarial
attack, especially black-box attack, and ImageNet in Section
2. Then DAmageNet will be described in Section 3 together
with initial experiments. Section 4 ends the manuscript with
a brief discussion.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Adversarial attack
Adversarial attacks [19] could reveal the weakness of DNN
by cheating it with adversarial samples, which differ from
original ones with only slight perturbations. In humans’
eyes, the adversarial sample does not have change from
the original ones, but well-trained networks make false
prediction in high confidence. The adversarial attack can
be expressed as below.
find ∆x
s.t. f(x) 6= f(x + ∆x)
‖∆x‖ ≤ 
(1)
When training DNNs, one updates the weights of the
network by the gradients with respective to the parameters
to minimize the loss. While in adversarial attacks, one alters
the image in the direction that increases the training loss. For
this basic idea, there have been many variants on attacking
space and crafting method.
For the attacking space, most of the existing directly
impose attack in the image space, see, e.g., [2], [20], [21]. It is
also reasonable to aim at latent feature vector space [5], [22]
or the encoder/decoder [23], [24]. Attack on feature spaces
may have better semantic meanings and are harder to detect
due to the perturbation unlike noise.
The methods that find the adversarial samples could
be roughly categorized as gradient-based [2], [4] and
optimization-based methods [3], [19]. Gradient-based meth-
ods search on the gradient direction and the magnitude
of perturbation is restricted in order to avoid distortion.
Optimization-based method includes the magnitude restric-
tion in the loss, i.e.,
arg min
∆x
Lattack = Ltrain + ρ ∗ d(x, x+ ∆x) (2)
where ρ specifies the degree to restrict distortion, d(·, ·) could
be l1, l2, l∞ norm or other distance metrics for different
purposes. Adam [25], SGD [26] or other optimizer could be
applied to optimize Lattack and achieve attack. Lattack could
also vary to meet different requirements.
2.2 Black-box attack
When the attacked DNNs are totally known, the attacks
mentioned above have high successful ratio. However, it is
almost impossible to have access to the victim model in real
scenarios and thus black-box attacks are required [27], [28],
[29]. For black-box attacks, the attacker does not access of
the attacked DNNs and the attacks relies on either query [6],
[7] or transferability [9], [27].
For query approach, the attacker adds slight perturbation
to the input image and observes the reaction the victim
model. By constant query, the gradient could be roughly
estimated and then one can do attack in the way similar
to white-box case. To choose the next pixel to alter for
gradient estimation, Bayes optimization [30], evolutional
algorithms [31], meta learning [32] etc could be considered.
Since the practical DNNs are generally very complicated,
good estimation of the gradients need massive number of
queries, from which it follows easy detections.
For transfer approach, one conducts white-box attack
in a well-designed surrogate model and expects that the
adversarial samples remain aggressive to other models. The
underlying assumption is that the distance between decision
boundaries across different classes is significantly shorter
than that across different models [27]. Although good attack
ratio has been reported recently [11], [14], it heavily relies on
good transferability of the surrogated and the attacked model,
e.g., VGG16 and VGG19. Until now, adversarial samples
which could beat many DNNs have not been reported
and there is no publicly available dataset providing useful
adversarial samples.
2.3 Use of adversarial samples
Since adversarial samples reveal the weak point of the DNNs,
they could be used in many aspects, including robustness
testing and training. For testing, every model is supposed
to be put in non-cooperative environment and tested its
performance in face of adversarial samples before being
applied massively [33], [34]. For training, usually called
adversarial training, the model is able to learn from its own
weakness. When one re-trains a model, huge number of
correct data is not as efficient as several data for which the
current model made wrong prediction. Therefore, crafted
adversarial samples are quite valuable for subsequent fine-
tuning [16], [17].
Since there is no efficient attack applicable to general
DNNs, the current use of adversarial samples are model-
dependent. That is the adversarial samples need to be
generated for a given DNN. Our DAmageNet is the first
data set providing adversarial samples for all DNNs. It could
serve as a benchmark for robustness test and also could be
directly used for adversarial training.
2.4 ImageNet and its variants
DAmageNet is obtained by modifying images from Ima-
geNet. ImageNet is a universal dataset publicized by [15].
It contains images of 1000 classes, each has 1300 well-
chosen samples. AlexNet [35] succeeds in emphasizing the
superiority of deep learning by significantly outperforming
rivals in ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge
(ILSVRC). Recent years have seen the appearance of a lot
of great models [36], [37], [38] and their improvements of
model accuracy in ImageNet. Many interesting variants of
ImageNet have been developed, including ImageNet-A [39],
ObjectNet [40], ImageNet-C, and ImageNet-P [41].
3ImageNet-A contains real-world images in ImageNet
classes, but they are able to mislead current classifiers to
output false predictions. They are real images out of the
manifold of ImageNet. The researchers select 200 typical
classes from original 1000 classes and collect 7500 samples
in total. Existing networks trained on ImageNet, even with
robustness enhancements, cannot work well on them.
ObjectNet also contains natural images that pretrained
models in ImageNet cannot distinguish. It controls that
the object has random background, rotation and viewpoint.
The models suffer from a performance drop up to 40-45%
in testing in ObjectNet. It contains 50000 images as the
validation set in ImageNet.
ImageNet-C is produced from ImageNet validation
images by adding 15 diverse corruptions. Each type of
corruption has 5 levels from the lightest to the severest. It
contains 50000 samples as in ImageNet validation set. It aims
to simulate common image corruptions in real scenarios
and their influence of DNN prediction. ImageNet-P is
designed from ImageNet-C and differs from it in possessing
additional perturbation sequences, which are not generated
by adversarial attack but are common image transformations.
The perturbations such as gaussian noise, motion blur, snow,
brightness, translation, and rotation are sampled randomly
and added to images repeated.
The datasets mentioned above are very valuable for test
and improving the generalization capability, but DAmageNet
is for robustness. In other words, samples in the above
datasets are different from the samples in ImageNet and
the low accuracy is due to lack of data. In DAmageNet, the
samples are quite similar to the original ones in ImageNet
and the low accuracy is due to the over-sensitivity of the
DNNs. Other difference is that adversarial samples are
relatively easy to obtain and the error is largely higher.
3 DAMAGENET
3.1 Description
DAmageNet contains 96020 adversarial samples in total and
it could be downloaded from http://www.pami.sjtu.edu.cn/
Show/56/122. The dataset contains 1000 folders with the
correct labels as the folder name, which are in the order of
ImageNet. In each of the folders, one can find around 100
adversarial samples. The file name is the index given to the
original image in ImageNet, by that one can easily find the
corresponding original image. The samples in DAmageNet
are very similar to those in ImageNet training set and the
root mean square deviation (||∆x||2) is about 3.8. In Fig. 2,
we demonstrate image pairs in ImageNet and DAmageNet.
3.2 Results
DAmageNet is to provide adversarial samples applicable
to many DNNs. Here, we use several pre-trained models
in Keras Applications [42] to recognize the images in
DAmageNet, clean images in DAmageNet. Compared to
the ImageNet results in original studies, the error rate (top-1)
is reported Table 1. Notice that when generating DAmageNet,
we do not access those attacked DNNs and the high error
rate shows that samples in DAmageNet could do zero-query
black-box attack. Thus, these samples could be used as a
benchmark to measure the robustness and to improve DNNs.
Fig. 2: Samples in ImageNet and DAmageNet. The images
on the left are original samples from ImageNet. The images
on the right are adversarial samples from DAmageNet. One
could observe that these images look similarly and human-
beings have no problem to recognize them as the same class.
TABLE 1: Error Rate (Top-1) in DAmageNet and ImageNet
(*For ImageNet, we only consider the images that generate DAma-
geNet, in oder to show the attack performance. For the error rates on
the whole ImageNet, please refer to the literatures. )
Network DAmageNet ImageNet
VGG16 [36] 99.7% 12.6%
VGG19 [36] 100.0% 5.1%
ResNet50 [37] 92.5% 11.4%
ResNet101 [37] 84.6% 17.3%
ResNet152 [37] 81.8% 16.6%
NASNetMobile [43] 90.3% 13.2%
NASNetLarge [43] 100.0% 4.8%
InceptionV3 [44] 96.7% 6.4%
InceptionV4 [45] 100.0% 11.7%
Xception [46] 100.0% 8.8%
DenseNet121 [38] 100.0% 15.2%
DenseNet169 [38] 94.3% 10.8%
DenseNet201 [38] 91.6% 9.5%
CondenseNet74-4 [47] 95.5% 18.3%
CondenseNet74-8 [47] 93.1% 22.5%
4 CONCLUSION
We provide DAmageNet, a dataset containing universal
adversarial samples. It is the first dataset that have samples
with small perturbation, strong aggression, and then high
cross-model attack ratio. It demonstrates that using zero-
query adversarial attack to create generalized adversarial
samples is possible, which is also a caution that without ro-
bustness enhancement (e.g., attack-against filter, attack-aware
detector) DNNs are very vulnerable. DAmageNet provides
benchmark from a different aspect to evaluate the robustness
of DNN by elaborately-crafted adversarial samples and offers
a helpful tool to further study transferability of attack. Since
its transferability, the defense designed for DAmageNet may
also have universality for many DNNs. Our algorithm to
craft DAmageNet will be explained in detail soon in another
paper.
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